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I. Introduction 
The collateral source rule bars a defendant from introducing 
evidence of payments or benefits a plaintiff received from a third 
party.1 While the rule is a longstanding staple of American tort 
law, it nonetheless invokes fervent debate.2 On one hand, the rule 
ratifies a windfall in favor of the plaintiff by allowing her to 
recover for expenses she never personally incurred.3 This seems 
contrary to certain aims of tort law, such as the principle that 
compensatory damages should make a plaintiff whole.4 On the 
other hand, the collateral source rule deters tortfeasors by 
ensuring that the defendant pays the entirety of the plaintiff’s 
medical expenses, regardless of whether the plaintiff or her 
health insurance provider were actually required to pay the bills.5 
                                                                                                     
 1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b (1979) (“Payments 
made or benefits conferred by other sources are known as collateral-source 
benefits. They do not have the effect of reducing the recovery against the 
defendant.”). 
 2. Compare Jamie L. Wershbale, Tort Reform in America: Abrogating the 
Collateral Source Rule Across the States, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 346, 357 (2008) (“The 
collateral source rule is an outmoded common law doctrine, no longer 
appropriate in the age of insurance, managed care, and public benefit 
programs.”), with Michael I. Krauss & Jeremy Kidd, Collateral Source and 
Tort’s Soul, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 1, 1 (2009) (“Indeed, the collateral source 
rule may be the ‘canary in the coal mine’: Its modification or elimination might 
endanger the integrity of tort law and signal the loss of ‘tort’s soul.’”). 
 3. See, e.g., 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-
RESTITUTION § 8.6(3) (2d ed. 1993) (“In the most typical case, the rule permits 
the plaintiff to recover full payment of his medical expenses from his own 
medical, health, or accident insurance and also to recover the full reasonable 
value of the same medical expenses from the defendant.”). 
 4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b (1979) (“The injured 
party’s net loss may have been reduced correspondingly, and to the extent that 
the defendant is required to pay the total amount there may be a double 
compensation for a part of the plaintiff's injury.”). 
 5. See id. (“One way of stating this conclusion is to say that it is the 
tortfeasor’s responsibility to compensate for all harm that he causes, not 
confined to the net loss that the injured party receives.”). 
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Outside factors such as healthcare reform and tort reform have 
contributed to the ongoing debate about the continued relevance 
of the collateral source rule.6 
The purpose of the collateral source rule is best understood in 
conjunction with the reasonable value doctrine.7 That doctrine 
states that a plaintiff is entitled to recover the reasonable value 
of her past medical expenses.8 While not dispositive of the issue,9 
many states presume that the amount billed for medical 
treatment represents its reasonable value.10 This presumption 
creates a disparity, however, when the healthcare provider 
accepts an amount lower than what was charged in full 
satisfaction of the bill.11 Healthcare providers frequently accept 
these lower amounts through negotiated discount agreements 
with health insurance carriers.12 In states where the collateral 
                                                                                                     
 6. See Adam G. Todd, An Enduring Oddity: The Collateral Source Rule in 
the Face of Tort Reform, the Affordable Care Act, and Increased Subrogation, 43 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 695, 977–87 (2012) (arguing that the renewed debate over 
the collateral source rule brought on by healthcare reform and tort reform has 
done little to actually change the rule in most jurisdictions). 
 7. See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 8.1(3) (presenting the intersection between 
the reasonable value doctrine and the collateral source rule). 
 8. See id. (“The value of medical and related treatment reasonably 
necessary to minimize or alleviate injury itself or the pain or disability that 
results from it are almost always recoverable as items of damage against the 
tortfeasor who caused the personal injury.”). 
 9. See id. (“The measure of recovery is not the cost of services or 
appliances needed but their reasonable value.”). 
 10.  See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN.  § 8.01-413.01 (2015) (“[T]he authenticity of 
bills for medical services provided and the reasonableness of the charges of the 
health care provider shall be rebuttably presumed upon identification by the 
plaintiff of the original bill or a duly authenticated copy and [certain testimony 
requirements].”); W. VA. CODE § 57-5-4j (2015) (“Proof that medical, hospital and 
doctor bills were paid or incurred because of any illness, disease or injury shall 
be prima facie evidence that such bills so paid or incurred were necessary and 
reasonable.”). 
 11.  See Rebecca Levenson, Comment, Allocating the Costs of Harm to 
Whom They Are Due: Modifying the Collateral Source Rule After Health Care 
Reform, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 932 (2012) (“Collateral sources often do not pay 
for medical services at full price, allowing an insured claimant to receive 
medical care at a reduced rate.”). 
 12. See, e.g., What’s the Cost?: Proposals to Provide Consumers with Better 
Information About Healthcare Service Costs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Health of the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 109th Cong. 106 (2006) 
(statement of Dr. Gerard Anderson, Professor, Bloomberg School of Public 
Health & School of Medicine at Johns Hopkins University; Director, Johns 
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source rule bars evidence of this discount, a plaintiff may recover 
the entire billed amount—a sum that some have characterized as 
a windfall.13  
This Note addresses whether the collateral source rule 
should bar a defendant from introducing evidence that a portion 
of a plaintiff’s medical expenses was written off by the healthcare 
provider pursuant to a negotiated discount agreement with the 
plaintiff’s health insurance carrier. Part II of this Note provides 
the historical background of the collateral source rule and 
discusses the arguments supporting and criticizing its continued 
applicability. Part III introduces the write-off issue and identifies 
the dominant approaches courts take to solve it. Part IV analyzes 
these approaches and suggests a workable solution that can serve 
as a compromise to reduce inflated damage awards while still 
retaining the important protections of the collateral source rule. 
II. Historical Background of the Collateral Source Rule 
The collateral source rule first appeared in Propeller 
Monticello v. Mollison.14 This case arose from a dispute following 
a collision between a schooner and a propeller on Lake Huron.15 
The propeller, who was found to be at fault, argued that the 
schooner’s recovery should be reduced by the amount the 
schooner received from insurance for the lost vessel.16 The 
                                                                                                     
Hopkins Center for Hospital Finance and Management) [hereinafter Healthcare 
Service Costs Hearing] (“Insurers obtain large discounts off . . . list prices—often 
as high as 75 percent.”); Lucette Lagando, California Hospitals Open Books, 
Showing Huge Price Differences, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 27, 2004), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB110410465492809649 (last visited Jun. 5, 2015) 
(“List prices are usually charged only to uninsured patients. Health plans 
negotiate big discounts and the government essentially dictates what it will 
pay.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 13. See Levenson, supra note 11, at 933 (“As a result of double payments 
and inflated awards, opponents blame the collateral source rule for increasing 
insurance payments and encouraging claimants to go to trial.”); Wershbale, 
supra note 2, at 350 (“In tort litigation, the written-off amount may be 
considered ‘phantom’ or ‘illusory’ damages. The amount written-off is often a 
substantial sum.”). 
 14. 58 U.S. 152 (1854). 
 15. Id. at 153. 
 16. Id. 
20 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 16 (2015) 
Supreme Court found that “[t]he contact with the insurer is in 
the nature of a wager between third parties, with which the 
trespasser has no concern.”17 Since this rule first appeared, it has 
been nearly universally accepted as a fundamental pillar of the 
American tort system.18  
The collateral source rule is generally conceptualized as 
having an evidentiary function and a substantive function.19 As 
an evidentiary rule, it permits trial courts to exclude evidence of 
collateral payments, such as payments made by a plaintiff’s 
medical insurance carrier or workers’ compensation benefits.20 As 
a substantive rule, it permits triers-of-fact to disregard collateral 
payments when calculating damages after determining liability.21 
The practical effect of the collateral source rule is that a plaintiff 
may receive compensation from her health insurance carrier to 
pay her medical bills without diminishing the amount she can 
recover against the tortfeasor—despite the possibility of a double 
recovery.22 
A. Rationales for the Collateral Source Rule 
The original justifications for the collateral source rule were 
that it would deter potential tortfeasors and ensure that 
tortfeasors would not benefit from the plaintiff’s choice to 
                                                                                                     
 17.  Id. at 155. 
 18.  See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 8.6(3) (“Except as modified by statute, the 
rule is almost invariably accepted in the courts.”); Krauss & Kidd, supra note 2, 
at 7–9 (documenting the rise of the collateral source rule in American, English, 
and Canadian law); Todd, supra note 6, at 965 (“The rule is, in fact, alive and 
well in American courthouses despite being subject to forces that many 
predicted would lead to its demise.”). 
 19.  See Todd, supra note 6, at 969–70 (“Courts treat the collateral source 
rule as a rule of evidence and a substantive rule of law.”). 
 20.  See id. at 970 (“It allows courts to exclude evidence during trial 
concerning collateral compensation . . . .”). 
 21.  See id. (“It allows courts . . . to calculate damages once the trier of fact 
establishes liability.”). 
 22.  See id. (“In the medical insurance context, the collateral source rule 
allows a plaintiff to receive compensation from her insurer for medical expenses 
related to her injuries and receive cumulative compensation for the same 
economic damages from the tortfeasor.”). 
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maintain insurance coverage.23 Both rationales persist today to 
justify the rule’s continued applicability.24 As a deterrent, the 
rule ensures that a tortfeasor pays the entire cost of the harm she 
causes the plaintiff.25 As a mechanism to prevent defendants from 
benefiting from a plaintiff’s choice to elect insurance coverage, the 
rule validates a windfall in favor of the plaintiff to prevent a 
windfall in favor of the defendant.26 
The collateral source rule works in conjunction with the 
reasonable value rule to ensure that triers-of-fact calculate the 
plaintiff’s damages for past medical expenses not by the actual 
cost the plaintiff incurred, but by the reasonable value of the 
medical care.27 Without the collateral source rule, the trier-of-fact 
could ignore the reasonable value rule and simply award the 
amount the plaintiff actually paid, without regard for any other 
expenses the plaintiff may have incurred or whether the amount 
                                                                                                     
 23.  See Levenson, supra note 11, at 927 (“Originally, courts justified the 
collateral source rule as a means of promoting tort deterrence and ensuring that 
a defendant tortfeasor would not benefit from the injured claimant’s insurance 
coverage.”). 
 24.  See id. at 928–31 (presenting arguments supporting the collateral 
source rule). 
 25.  See id. at 928–29 (“[Advocates for the collateral source rule] assert that 
it is fundamental to tort law for tortfeasors to pay the consequences for their 
actions, and that the deterrent effect of tort law is undermined when a 
claimant’s medical expenses are covered by his own insurance.”). 
 26.  See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 8.6(3) (“Perhaps the weakest argument 
made in support of the collateral source rule is the one that has been most 
mentioned by the courts—the wrongdoing defendant should not get the benefit 
of any reduction in the plaintiff’s damages by a collateral source, since this 
would be a ‘windfall’ . . . .”); Krauss & Kidd, supra note 2, at 28 (arguing that the 
collateral source rule ensures that the plaintiff’s damages correlate with the 
defendant’s wrongdoing rather than make the plaintiff whole); Todd, supra note 
6, at 974 (“Notions of fairness and justice favor the defendant-tortfeasor paying 
for all of the damages of his tortious behavior and not receiving the benefits of 
collateral source compensation provided to the plaintiff by an insurance 
policy.”); Todd R. Lyle, Comment, Phantom Damages and the Collateral Source 
Rule: How Recent Hyperinflation in Medical Costs Disturbs South Carolina’s 
Application of the Collateral Source Rule, 65 S.C. L. REV. 853, 855 (2014) (“[I]f a 
windfall is going to occur, it should favor the innocent plaintiff as opposed to the 
defendant.”). 
 27.  See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 8.1(3) (“Indeed, recovery does not depend on 
whether there is any bill at all, because under the collateral source rule the 
tortfeasor is liable for the value of the services even if they are given without 
charge.”). 
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accepted as payment was reasonable.28 This rationale is 
undermined, however, by the fact that many states constrain the 
role of the trier-of-fact by enacting statutory presumptions that 
the amount billed for medical services reflects its reasonable 
value.29 
A modern rationale for the collateral source rule’s continued 
applicability is that it allows plaintiffs to finance litigation in the 
face of contingency fees that could total as much as fifty percent 
of a plaintiff’s recovery.30 In essence, the rule allows plaintiffs to 
be made whole after insurance premiums, attorney’s fees, and 
other costs that are not reimbursed by a collateral source are 
factored into the plaintiff’s ultimate economic situation after 
recovery.31 This justification is not applicable in cases in which 
courts award attorneys’ fees and costs to a plaintiff, yet 
nonetheless apply the collateral source rule.32 
In cases in which the collateral source is the plaintiff’s 
insurance carrier, another rationale for the rule is that the 
plaintiff paid for the benefit of health insurance through monthly 
insurance premium payments.33 This rationale does not apply, 
however, to collateral sources the plaintiff did not pay for, such as 
gratuitous payments from relatives or other philanthropic third 
                                                                                                     
 28.  See id. (“Recovery is not limited to expenses of treatment or even to 
expenses for relief of pain. Any reasonable expense, adequately proved to be a 
result of the injury, is an item of damage.”). But see id. (“It has been said, 
however, that if the provider of medical services charges less than their value 
without intending a gift, the plaintiff’s recovery is limited to the liability 
incurred.”). 
 29.  See supra note 10 and accompanying text (providing examples of 
statutory provisions that give medical bills a presumption of reasonability). 
 30.  See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 8.6(3) (“[I]t is clear that a winning plaintiff 
may still recover only half of his losses unless he can pad the award with pain 
and suffering damages or collateral source rule damages to absorb fees and 
expenses.”). 
 31.  See Levenson, supra note 11, at 929–30 (“[Advocates for the collateral 
source rule] argue that collateral sources never pay the full costs of recovery to 
the plaintiff . . . .”). 
 32.  See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 8.6(3) (“If this were the only reason for 
adoption of the collateral source rule, the rule should not apply at all in those 
cases where attorney fees are separately awarded against the losing 
defendant.”). 
 33.  See id. (“[I]t is possible to argue that the plaintiff paid for the benefit he 
is receiving and that the defendant ought not benefit from the plaintiff’s 
investment.”). 
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parties.34 It has also been criticized on the grounds that a 
potential plaintiff likely does not maintain her insurance 
coverage because she expects a double recovery in the event she 
is wronged.35 In addition, the amount the plaintiff paid into the 
insurance fund does not necessarily correlate with the amount of 
collateral source payments she receives.36 
A final justification for the rule is that, after her insurance 
carrier exercises its subrogation rights, the plaintiff has no 
double recovery.37 Subrogation is typically accomplished by 
allowing an insurance carrier to seek reimbursement from the 
plaintiff following a judgment, although an insurance carrier can 
also subrogate by directly asserting the rights of the insured 
against a defendant.38 Some have suggested that subrogation 
rights and the collateral source rule work in tandem, each serving 
as a justification for the other.39 This rationale is weakened, 
however, by the fact that courts apply the collateral source rule 
even in cases in which no subrogation rights exist.40 A second 
objection to this rationale is that it ignores the costs associated 
with subrogation.41 While the continued application of the 
collateral source rule and enforcement of subrogation rights may 
lower premiums for medical insurance carriers, this system 
                                                                                                     
 34.  See id. (“This argument cannot be made in all cases, because the 
plaintiff has not chosen to pay for all collateral source benefits.”). 
 35.  See id. (“Denying the plaintiff a double recovery will thus not frustrate 
the plaintiff’s expectation . . . .”). 
 36.  See id. (“[A]lthough the plaintiff paid premiums for his insurance, he 
did not necessarily pay an amount equal to the benefits.”). 
 37.  See Levenson, supra note 11, at 930–31 (describing the effect of 
subrogation on the plaintiff’s ultimate recovery in personal injury litigation); 
Krauss & Kidd, supra note 2, at 31 (“Where subrogation is conventionally 
agreed to, the application of the [collateral source rule] is not problematic.”). 
 38.  See Todd, supra note 6, at 987 (discussing the role of subrogation in the 
debate about the collateral source rule). 
 39.  See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 8.6(3) (“Courts have often suggested that 
protection of subrogation rights justifies the collateral source rule.”). 
 40.  See id. (“However, most courts have not limited the collateral source 
rule to cases in which subrogation rights exist, so this reason applies at best 
only to one group of collateral source cases.”); see also Wershbale, supra note 2, 
at 349–50 (indicating that even where subrogation rights exist, insurance 
carriers often choose not to pursue them due to high administrative costs or 
potential damage to the insurer’s reputation). 
 41.  See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 8.6(3) (“A more important objection is that 
there are costs in making subrogation work.”). 
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contributes to higher premiums for liability insurance carriers 
who bear the bulk of the added expense.42  
B. Criticism of the Collateral Source Rule 
While the collateral source rule still exists in most 
jurisdictions, it nonetheless garners sharp criticism about its 
continued relevance.43 The primary criticism of the collateral 
source rule is that it is inconsistent with the notion of corrective 
justice: the view that the goal of tort law should be to make the 
plaintiff whole.44 A double-recovery facilitated by the rule does 
not serve this purpose because the plaintiff is, from a purely 
economic standpoint, in a better position than she was before the 
harm.45 Some argue that allowing the double-recovery amounts to 
a disguised form of additional punitive damages.46 This argument 
largely fails, however, because in many cases there simply is not 
a double-recovery after the plaintiff’s insurance carrier exercises 
its subrogation rights and the plaintiff pays her attorney.47 
                                                                                                     
 42.  See id. (“Rejection of the collateral source rule might save citizens in 
general more premium money by providing a credit and eliminating the expense 
of subrogation itself.”). 
 43.  See Todd, supra note 6, at 971 (“These debates reflect disagreement 
about the collateral source rule specifically and the nature and purpose of tort 
law in general.”); Krauss & Kidd, supra note 2, at 11–12 (enumerating the 
grounds upon which scholars have attacked the collateral source rule); 
Levenson, supra note 11, at 922 (framing the debate about the collateral source 
rule over the last few decades). 
 44.  See id. (“The collateral source rule is inconsistent with corrective or 
compensatory notions of justice found in other areas of tort law.”). 
 45.  See id. at 972 (“This double recovery scenario creates a situation where 
the plaintiff is put in a better position than before the tort occurred, thereby 
conflicting with the compensatory function of tort law.”). 
 46.  See Levenson, supra note 11, at 932 (“For those opponents who view the 
purpose of tort law as solely compensatory, the collateral source rule seems to 
facilitate the payment of additional punitive damages.”). 
 47.  See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 8.6(3) (describing the effect of subrogation 
and litigation finance on the plaintiff’s perceived double recovery facilitated by 
the collateral source rule); Krauss & Kidd, supra note 2, at 22 (“[T]he [collateral 
source rule] could also be viewed as a slapdash method by which to compensate 
for other shortcomings of the tort system, such as non-recoverable attorney’s 
fees.”); Todd, supra note 6, at 976 (presenting the argument that collateral 
source rule serves to adequately compensate and otherwise undercompensated 
plaintiff under the current system).  
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Another flaw with the corrective justice criticism is that tort law 
does not exist solely to make the plaintiff whole; rather, there are 
many instances in which a plaintiff may recover more than her 
economic losses.48  
Some have questioned the collateral source rule following 
healthcare reform.49 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (PPACA),50 specifically the individual mandate,51 altered the 
rationale behind the collateral source rule.52 The individual 
mandate introduced a new class of plaintiffs—the willfully 
uninsured.53 These plaintiffs who elect to incur a tax penalty 
rather than procure health insurance will benefit from the 
collateral source rule.54 The rule makes the plaintiff’s status as 
insured or uninsured irrelevant to the calculation of damages, 
placing the willfully uninsured claimant on the same footing as 
the insured claimant—despite her decision to shirk her obligation 
under the PPACA to maintain health insurance.55 In this way, 
the individual mandate undermines the rule’s function as an 
incentive to purchase health insurance.56 Some have argued that 
the PPACA would undermine the collateral source rule if it were 
to realize the goal of universal healthcare coverage because it 
                                                                                                     
 48.  See Todd, supra note 6, at 972 (indicating that because “tort law is 
particularly inconsistent on this point,” the corrective justice argument against 
the collateral source rule is unpersuasive). 
 49.  See Todd, supra note 6, at 982 (“The new federal healthcare legislation 
and similar state healthcare initiatives potentially undermine the collateral 
source rule . . . .”). 
 50.  Pub L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 51.  See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012) (creating a tax penalty for individuals 
who fail to obtain minimum healthcare insurance coverage). 
 52.  See Levenson, supra note 11, at 936–48 (“In light of the [PPACA], 
arguments for upholding the common law collateral source rule are no longer as 
persuasive as they were before.”). 
 53.  See id. at 934–36 (discussing the effect of the introduction of the 
willfully uninsured claimant on the scope of the collateral source rule). 
 54.  See id. at 934 (“[T]he rule would now benefit uninsured individuals who 
shirk their obligations to obtain insurance under the [PPACA].”). 
 55.  See id. at 936 (“[T]he collateral source rule allows willfully uninsured 
claimants to hide their lack of health coverage during trial and during 
calculation of damages.”). 
 56.  See Todd, supra note 6, at 982 (“Some judges aver that the plaintiff-
insured’s ‘foresight’ in purchasing insurance should be rewarded.”). 
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would then be nearly impossible for a juror to disregard a 
plaintiff’s insurance coverage when calculating damages for past 
medical expenses.57 But the reality is that the PPACA does not 
achieve universal healthcare coverage; rather, the patchwork of 
the insurance market ultimately makes this argument against 
the continued applicability of the collateral source rule following 
healthcare reform unpersuasive.58 
Proponents of tort reform have also criticized the collateral 
source rule.59 Tort reform movements—largely driven by 
corporate and insurance industry advocates and lobbyists—have 
sought, among other goals, to reduce the number of lawsuits and 
impose caps on noneconomic and punitive damages.60 Advocates 
for tort reform have sought to eliminate the incentive the 
collateral source rule creates for plaintiffs to file lawsuits.61 These 
movements have led some states to completely abandon the 
rule.62 While modification or abrogation of the collateral source 
rule as a component of tort reform sought to introduce more 
certainty and coherence to tort systems, the result often has been 
fragmentation and inconsistency in the rule’s application.63 
The collateral source rule has also drawn criticism due to its 
effect on the ability of a trier-of-fact to calculate the accurate 
reasonable cost of past medical expenses when healthcare 
                                                                                                     
 57.  See id. at 985 (“If the [PPACA] achieves near-universal coverage, a 
juror would have a difficult time disregarding insurance coverage for a 
plaintiff’s tortious injuries since a juror will expect the plaintiff to have 
insurance.”). 
 58.  See id. at 968 (“The absence of universal coverage undermines the 
arguments supporting the predicted demise of the collateral source rule.”). 
 59.  See id. at 977 (“In the past twenty years, the collateral source rule came 
under the greatest scrutiny by tort reform advocates.”). 
 60.  See id. at 977–78 (describing tort reform efforts across the United 
States). 
 61.  See id. at 978 (“Because the collateral source rule apparently 
‘overcompensates’ plaintiffs and provides a financial incentive for plaintiffs to 
bring an action, tort reform advocates who sought to limit the number and size 
of awards favored abolition of the rule.”); Wershbale, supra note 2, at 357 
(“Abrogation of the collateral source rule, in concert with other tort reforms, 
provides an avenue to reduce the cost of the American tort system by 
eliminating many marginal cases.”). 
 62.  See infra Part III.D (noting states that have abandoned the rule 
entirely). 
 63.  See Todd, supra note 6, at 980 (“Incoherency and fragmentation in the 
law increase the cost of both the tort system and health insurance.”). 
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providers write off portions of plaintiffs’ medical bills.64 Medical 
providers often enter into negotiated discount agreements with 
insurance providers, and the rule typically bars evidence of these 
discounts.65 When a medical provider accepts less than the billed 
amount for medical expenses, the collateral source rule creates a 
discrepancy between the amount a plaintiff recovers and the 
amount anyone actually paid.66 This issue is the main focus of 
this Note because resolving it can address other criticisms of the 
collateral source rule while retaining the rule’s protections.67 
Despite its criticisms, the collateral source rule remains a 
vital part of personal injury litigation. As one scholar put it, 
“[R]eports of the impending death of the collateral source rule are 
greatly exaggerated.”68 While many of the rule’s criticisms are 
legitimate, it would be improper to completely abandon the 
important protections the rule guarantees because the rationales 
supporting the rule endure.69 Resolving the write-off issue 
introduced above can balance the strengths and weaknesses of 
the rule and serve as a practical compromise between retaining 
the strict common law rule and completely abandoning the rule.70 
                                                                                                     
 64. See Lyle, supra note 26, at 853–54 (introducing the difficulty courts face 
in calculating damages when hospitals’ hyperinflated list prices for medical 
services are later written off). 
 65.  See Levenson, supra note 11, at 933 (“States allow claimants to collect 
write-offs under the collateral source rule because disclosure of the reduced 
payment often suggests that a collateral source paid for these expenses, 
undermining the purpose of keeping this information from the jury.”). 
 66.  See id. at 932 (“Collateral sources often do not pay for medical services 
at full price, allowing an insured claimant to receive medical care at a reduced 
rate.”). 
 67.  See infra Parts III–IV (presenting the write-off issue, the approaches 
courts have taken to address it, and an argument in favor of a middle-ground 
solution). 
 68.  Todd, supra note 6, at 965 (referencing a quote attributed to Mark 
Twain that “the reports of my death have been greatly exaggerated”). 
 69.  See id. at 987 (“Many of the rationales in favor of maintaining the 
collateral source rule remain in effect . . . .”); Krauss & Kidd, supra note 2, at 5 
(arguing that victims do not receive justice where the collateral source rule has 
been abandoned). 
 70.  See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text (introducing the 
complications the collateral source rule creates when confronted with write-offs 
or negotiated discount agreements between insurers and healthcare providers). 
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III. The Write-Off Issue and How Courts Have Addressed It 
Vast discrepancies often exist between the amounts initially 
billed for medical treatment and the amounts healthcare 
providers ultimately accept as payment for their services.71 These 
discrepancies, characterized by some as write-offs and by others 
as negotiated discounts, often occur pursuant to agreements 
between healthcare providers and insurance carriers that are in 
place before the plaintiff receives medical treatment.72 The issue 
arises when the plaintiff presents medical bills as evidence of the 
reasonable cost of her past medical expenses, while in reality the 
total sum paid by the plaintiff and her health insurance carrier is 
substantially less.73 The collateral source rule could—and in 
many jurisdictions does—prevent a defendant from introducing 
evidence of the negotiated discount.74 While courts take numerous 
approaches to this issue, the three most common approaches are 
the traditional application of the collateral source rule, 
application of a modified version of the collateral source rule, and 
abandonment of the collateral source rule.75 
                                                                                                     
 71.  See, e.g., Healthcare Costs Hearing, supra note 12, at 106 (“I have 
actually seen contracts where the discount from list price was over 900 percent 
and in this case the hospital was still earning a profit from the insurer because 
the negotiated rate was above the hospital’s actual costs.”). 
 72.  See, e.g., Kenney v. Liston, 760 S.E.2d 434, 450 (W. Va. 2014) (Loughry, 
J., dissenting) (“[A]t the time the charges were incurred, the medical provider 
and the insurer had already agreed on a different price for the services 
rendered.”). 
 73.  See, e.g., Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130 
(Cal. 2011) (“The [hospital] declaration stated that of the $122,841 billed for 
plaintiff's surgeries, [the insurance carrier] paid $24,380, plaintiff paid $3,566, 
and the remaining $94,894 was written off or waived by [the hospital] pursuant 
to the agreement between [the hospital] and the patient’s private healthcare 
insurer . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 74.  See Levenson, supra note 11, at 932–33 (“Under the collateral source 
rule, claimants are able to collect the write-off—the difference between the 
actual cost and the reasonable cost of the care paid by the collateral source.”). 
 75.  See Lori A. Roberts, Rhetoric, Reality, and the Wrongful Abrogation of 
the Collateral Source Rule in Personal Injury Cases, 31 REV. LITIG. 99, 102 (2012) 
(describing the wide array of approaches state courts and legislatures have 
taken to resolving the write-off issue). 
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A. Traditional Application of the Common Law Collateral Source 
Rule 
The majority approach applies the traditional common law 
collateral source rule and bars any evidence of the written-off 
portion of the medical bill.76 The Supreme Court of Appeals of 
                                                                                                     
 76.  See, e.g., McConnell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 
1169 (D. Nev. 2014) (finding that, under Nevada law, write-offs of medical bills 
are payments within the meaning of the collateral source rule); Aumand v. 
Dartmouth Hitchcock Med. Ctr., 611 F. Supp. 2d 78, 91–92 (D.N.H. 2009) 
(“[T]he significant risk of unfair prejudice to [the plaintiff] from proof of what 
her insurers actually paid to settle her medical bills—that is, that the jury may 
improperly reduce any award to the estate—substantially outweighs any 
probative value of that proof to the value of the care . . . .”); Pipkins v. TA 
Operating Corp., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1261–62 (D.N.M. 2006) (“New Mexico 
case law, along with the policy rationale underlying New Mexico’s adoption of 
the collateral source rule, indicates that Medicare write offs would be treated 
the same as any other benefit a plaintiff may receive from a collateral source.”); 
Calva-Cerqueira v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 2d 279, 295–96 (D.D.C. 2003) 
(“The collateral source rule applies in this case because the source of the benefit, 
the plaintiff’s medical care providers’ alleged writing-off of costs, is independent 
of the tortfeasor.”); Lopez v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 129 P.3d 487, 496 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2006) (“[W]e hold that [the plaintiff] was entitled to claim and recover the 
full amount of her reasonable medical expenses for which she was charged, 
without any reduction for the amounts apparently written off by her healthcare 
providers pursuant to contractually agreed-upon rates with her medical 
insurance carriers.”); Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 976 S.W.2d 
382, 385 (Ark. 1998) (“We choose to adopt the rule that gratuitous or discounted 
medical services are a collateral source not to be considered in assessing the 
damages due a personal-injury plaintiff.”); Tucker v. Volunteers of Am. Colo. 
Branch, 211 P.3d 708, 712–13 (Colo. App. 2008) (“[W]e conclude that the 
contract between plaintiff’s insurer and the health care providers which 
decreased the amount actually paid for plaintiff’s medical care inured to 
plaintiff’s benefit and falls within the [collateral source rule].”); Mitchell v. 
Haldar, 883 A.2d 32, 40 (Del. 2005) (“We hold that the trial judge erred by 
excluding the full amount of the medical bills as evidence of the total amount of 
[the plaintiff’s] reasonable medical expenses.”); Olariu v. Marrero, 549 S.E.2d 
121, 123 (Ga. 2001) (“[The defendant] is not entitled to use a third party’s write-
off of medical expenses as a set-off against [the plaintiff’s] recovery of past 
medical expenses.”); Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d 1149, 1156–57 (Haw. 2004) 
(“[T]he difference between the standard rate and the Medicare/Medicaid 
payment may be viewed as a part of the ‘benefits conferred on the injured party’ 
within the scope of the collateral source rule.”); Wills v. Foster, 892 N.E.2d 1018, 
1032–33 (Ill. 2008) (“Defendants may not, however, introduce evidence that the 
plaintiff's bills were settled for a lesser amount because to do so would 
undermine the collateral source rule.”); Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc. v. Miller, 
177 S.W.3d 676, 683–84 (Ky. 2005) (“It is absurd to suggest that the tortfeasor 
should receive a benefit from a contractual arrangement between Medicare and 
the health care provider.”); White v. Jubitz Corp., 219 P.3d 566, 583 (Or. 2009) 
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West Virginia illustrated the dominant reasoning that courts use 
to justify a strict application of the collateral source rule to the 
write-off issue in Kenney v. Liston.77 In that case, the defendant 
rear-ended the plaintiff and caused “serious, permanent, painful 
injuries to [the plaintiff’s] spine.”78 The plaintiff’s medical bills 
were over $70,000.79 The healthcare provider accepted a lower 
amount pursuant to a negotiated discount agreement with the 
plaintiff’s insurance carrier.80 The defendant filed a motion in 
limine arguing that the plaintiff’s recovery should be limited to 
the portions of the medical bills that had been paid by either the 
plaintiff or his health insurance carrier.81 The Monongalia 
County Circuit Court denied the motion, finding that the write-
offs were a collateral source and the collateral source rule barred 
the evidence.82 
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed, 
holding that the collateral source rule does not differentiate 
between the types of benefits the plaintiff can receive, as long as 
                                                                                                     
(“[E]xclusion of ‘write-offs’ from the amount . . . a plaintiff may claim creates the 
anomaly that a defendant will be liable for the full reasonable charges that a 
medical provider makes to an uninsured person . . . , but may have more limited 
liability if the injured person is insured . . . .”); Covington v. George, 597 S.E.2d 
142,144–45 (S.C. 2004) (“We hold that the collateral source rule is directly 
implicated in this case, and the actual payment amount was properly 
excluded.”); Papke v. Harbert, 738 N.W.2d 510, 535–36 (S.D. 2007) (“[T]he 
collateral source rule applies and defendants are precluded from entering into 
evidence the amounts ‘written off’ by medical care providers because of 
contractual agreements with sources independent of defendants.”); Acuar v. 
Letourneau, 531 S.E.2d 316, 322 (Va. 2000) (“The portions of medical expenses 
that health care providers write off constitute compensation or indemnity 
received by a tort victim from a source collateral to the tortfeasor.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Leitinger v. DBart, Inc., 736 N.W.2d 1, 18 (Wis. 
2007) (“The admission in evidence of the amount actually paid in the present 
case, even if marginally relevant, might bring complex, confusing side issues 
before the fact-finder that are not necessarily related to the value of the medical 
services rendered.”). 
 77.  760 S.E.2d 434 (W. Va. 2014). 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. at 438. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  See id. (“The defendant contends that since the full bills were neither 
paid nor actually incurred by the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s health insurance 
carrier, the plaintiff should not be allowed to introduce evidence of those 
written-off amounts at trial.”). 
 82.  Id. 
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the benefit does not come from the defendant.83 The court 
embraced the reasonable value doctrine, finding that this 
interpretation of the collateral source rule allows the plaintiff to 
recover the reasonable value of his medical bills, “not the 
expenditures actually made or obligations incurred.”84 The 
defendant had distinguished between payments and other 
benefits, arguing that the collateral source rule only applies to 
payments.85 The court “reject[ed] this tenuous distinction, 
because the law is clear that the collateral source rule applies to 
any benefit received by a plaintiff from any source in line the with 
plaintiff’s interests.”86 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Allen Loughry argued that 
the majority’s decision permits damages for medical bills to be 
calculated “based on fictitious evidence that bears no relationship 
to the plaintiff’s actual losses.”87 Justice Loughry found that “[i]t 
is simply absurd to conclude that the amount billed for a certain 
procedure reflects the ‘reasonable value’ of that medical service” 
because medical providers utilize tactics similar to retailers that 
involve exorbitant markups and subsequent discounts to ensure a 
profit.88 The dissent specifically challenged the presumed 
reasonability of medical bills, arguing that no evidence the 
defendant could offer could overcome the presumption.89 Justice 
Loughry asserted that this logic implied that healthcare 
                                                                                                     
 83.  See id. at 445–46 (“[T]he rule that collateral source benefits are not 
subtracted from a plaintiff’s recovery applies to proceeds or benefits from 
sources such as insurance policies, . . . employment benefits; services or benefits 
rendered gratuitously (whether free, discounted, or later written off); and social 
legislation benefits.”). 
 84.  Id. at 444; see also id. at 445 (“The damage is sustained when the 
plaintiff incurs the liability, and the method by which that liability is later 
discharged has no effect on the measure of damages.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 85.  Id. at 444. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 449 (Loughry, J., dissenting). 
 88.  Id. at 451. 
 89.  See id. at 452 (“What more probative evidence of the reasonable value 
of the services could there be than the negotiated and paid rate for the services? 
What more could a defendant offer to rebut the prima facie presumption 
established in West Virginia Code § 57-5-4j?”). 
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providers “routinely and as a matter of freely-negotiated 
contracts accept less than the reasonable value of the services.”90  
While critical of the rule’s application in this case, Justice 
Loughry’s dissent did not advocate for the abandonment of the 
collateral source rule.91 Rather, he found that although the 
ultimate amount recoverable would be reduced, limiting recovery 
to the amount actually paid would still retain the protections of 
the rule.92 Justice Loughry relied heavily on California’s approach 
to the collateral source rule in his dissent.93 States like California 
that have modified the collateral source rule to allow defendants 
to introduce evidence of write-offs have demonstrated that the 
approach favored by Justice Loughry’s dissent is an effective 
solution to the write-off issue.        
B. Application of a Modified Version of the Collateral Source Rule 
Some courts have approached the write-off issue by 
modifying the strict common law collateral source rule to create 
an exception that permits the defendant to introduce evidence of 
write-offs.94 States that have adopted modified approaches 
preserve the plaintiff’s interests protected by the collateral source 
rule while acknowledging the compelling argument that the 
presumption of reasonability given to medical bills is flawed in 
                                                                                                     
 90. Id. 
 91.  See id. at 450 (“Precluding recovery for the ‘write-offs’ or discounts does 
not contravene the collateral source rule.”). 
 92.  See id. at 452 (“Limiting the amounts which can be recovered as 
damages for medical expenses to those amounts actually paid, as opposed to 
fictitious amounts generated by medical providers to ensure they can still make 
a profit after giving a substantial discount, does not thwart the rationale behind 
the collateral source rule.”). 
 93.  See id. at 451 (“[T]he court found that the gratuitous services exception 
to the rule limiting recovery to a plaintiff’s economic loss ‘has no application to 
commercially-negotiated price agreements like those between medical providers 
and health insurers,’ . . . .” (quoting Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, 257 
P.3d 1130, 1139 (Cal. 2011)). 
 94.  See Howell, 257 P.3d at 1145 (allowing the defendant to introduce 
evidence that the healthcare provider accepted a discounted payment); Robinson 
v. Bates, 857 N.E.2d 1195, 1200–01 (Ohio 2007) (allowing a trier-of-fact to hear 
evidence of both the billed amount and discounted amount to determine the 
reasonable value of past medical expenses). 
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light of the fact that nearly no one actually pays these amounts.95 
Courts in California and Ohio have addressed the write-off issue 
through differing modified approaches that are both worth 
discussion.  
 1. California Approach 
The California approach appears in Howell v. Hamilton 
Meats & Provisions, Inc.96 Here, the Supreme Court of California 
addressed the issue of whether a plaintiff whose medical provider 
has accepted an amount less than what is stated on the bill as 
full payment should be permitted to recover the undiscounted 
billed amount.97 The case arose from a car accident for which the 
defendant conceded liability.98 The plaintiff’s total medical bills 
were roughly $190,000—$130,000 of which was discounted 
pursuant to an agreement between the hospital and insurance 
carrier.99  
The defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of 
bills that were not paid by either the plaintiff or her health 
insurance carrier.100 The trial court denied the motion, ruling 
that the defendant should make a post-trial motion to reduce 
medical damages.101 The defendant did so, and the trial court 
granted the post-trial motion.102 The California Court of Appeals 
reversed, holding that the reduction violated the collateral source 
rule.103 
The Supreme Court of California held that the plaintiff could 
not recover the undiscounted billed amount for her medical 
expenses.104 The court reasoned that recoverable damages for 
                                                                                                     
 95.  See Healthcare Service Costs Hearing, supra note 12, at 105 (“There is 
not a requirement that anyone ever pays that posted price and in fact the posted 
price is seldom paid.”). 
 96.  257 P.3d 1130 (Cal. 2011). 
 97. Id. at 1133. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. at 1134. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  See id. at 1145 (“[A]n injured plaintiff whose medical expenses are paid 
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medical expenses “must be both incurred and reasonable.”105 The 
court also found that because the agreement between the 
plaintiff’s insurance carrier and the hospital was in place before 
the plaintiff’s treatment, she was never actually liable for the full 
amount billed.106 The court was not persuaded that the 
negotiated discount was a benefit for the plaintiff; rather, the 
court found that the parties to the agreement negotiated it 
primarily for the benefit of the insurance carrier.107 While the 
court recognized that there could be cases in which a plaintiff 
would be liable for the full amount billed, it ultimately found that 
it “should not order one defendant to pay damages for an 
economic loss the plaintiff has not suffered merely because a 
different defendant may have to compensate a different plaintiff 
who has suffered such a loss.”108 Not only did the court find that 
evidence of the discount was relevant and admissible, the court 
went a step further and found that “[w]here the provider has, by 
prior agreement, accepted less than a billed amount as full 
payment, evidence of the full billed amount is not itself relevant 
on the issue of past medical expenses.”109 The court left open the 
question of whether the billed amount could be admissible for 
some other purpose.110 
                                                                                                     
through private insurance may recover as economic damages no more than the 
amounts paid by the plaintiff or his or her insurer for the medical services 
received or still owing at the time of trial.”). 
 105. Id. at 1137; see also id. at 1138 (“Thus, the general rule under the 
restatement, as well as California law, is that a personal injury plaintiff may 
recover the lesser of (a) the amount paid or incurred for medical services, and (b) 
the reasonable value of the services.”). 
 106.  See id. at 1139 (“[H]er prospective liability was limited to the amounts 
[her insurance carrier] had agreed to pay the providers for the services they 
were to render. Plaintiff cannot meaningfully be said ever to have incurred the 
full charges.”). 
 107.  See id. at 1144 (“Insurers and medical providers negotiate rates in 
pursuit of their own business interests, and the benefits of the bargains made 
accrue directly to the negotiating parties. The primary benefit of discounted 
rates for medical care goes to the payer of those rates—that is, in largest part, 
the insurer.”). 
 108.  Id. at 1145 (citation omitted). 
 109.  Id. at 1146. 
 110.  See id. (suggesting that the billed amount could be relevant for 
determining non-economic damages or damages for future medical expenses); 
infra notes 122125 and accompanying text (proposing purposes for which the 
billed amount could be admissible). 
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2. Ohio Approach 
The Ohio approach appears in Robinson v. Bates.111 Robinson 
arose from the plaintiff’s injuries following a fall at her residence 
due to her landlord’s repair work.112 The plaintiff introduced 
evidence that her medical bills were $1,919 but stipulated that 
the healthcare provider accepted $1,350.43 in full satisfaction of 
the bill pursuant to a negotiated discount with her insurance 
carrier.113 The trial court refused to admit the original medical 
bills, and the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed.114 
The Supreme Court of Ohio held that “both the original 
medical bill rendered and the amount accepted as full payment 
for medical services should have been admitted.”115 The court 
found that, in addition to the amount accepted as payment, the 
court should also admit the amount originally billed.116 Once the 
plaintiff introduces the original amount, the court found that the 
defendant should be permitted to introduce evidence that the 
amount was unreasonable.117 The court found that allowing the 
defendant to introduce evidence of a write-off does not contravene 
the collateral source rule.118 Recognizing the disparities that can 
arise from case to case, the court noted that a bright-line rule 
presuming the reasonability of either the billed amount or the 
discounted amount would not be appropriate.119 Rather, the 
calculation of the reasonable value must be performed by the 
trier-of-fact with all the relevant evidence in each specific case.120 
                                                                                                     
 111.  857 N.E.2d 1195 (Ohio 2006). 
 112.  Id. at 1196–97. 
 113.  Id. at 1197. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  See id. (“[O]riginal bills are certainly evidence of the value that the 
medical providers themselves place upon their services.”). 
 117.  See id. at 1198 (“Once medical bills are admitted, a defendant may 
present evidence to challenge their reasonableness.”). 
 118.  See id. at 1200 (“[B]ecause no one pays the negotiated reduction, 
admitting evidence of write-offs does not violate the purpose of the collateral 
source rule.”). 
 119.  See id. (“[I]n any given case, that determination is not necessarily the 
amount of the original bill or the amount paid.”). 
 120.  See id. (“[T]he reasonable value of medical services is a matter for the 
jury to determine from all relevant evidence.”). 
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The court ultimately left the responsibility of calculating the 
reasonable value of medical expenses to the jury, leaving them 
free to award “the amount originally billed, the amount the 
medical provider accepted as payment, or some amount in 
between.”121 
Justice Lundberg Stratton’s opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part argued that, while both the amount billed and 
the amount paid should be admissible, the plaintiff should only 
be able to recover the amount actually paid for treatment.122 
While she would not permit a plaintiff to recover the billed 
amount, she believed that amount could be relevant “in 
evaluating pain and suffering and the extent of the injuries, past 
and future.”123 Justice Lundberg Stratton recognized that, 
without admitting the billed amount as evidence, the seriousness 
and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries could be distorted.124 
Although the California court in Howell offered no opinion as to 
whether the billed amount could be relevant for some purpose 
other than calculating damages for past medical expense, Justice 
Lundberg Stratton’s opinion in Robinson demonstrates other 
purposes for which the billed amount could be relevant.125 The 
Ohio legislature responded to the Robinson decision by codifying 
its holding.126    
                                                                                                     
 121.  Id. 
 122.  See id. at 1202 (Lundberg Stratton, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“I would limit recovery for medical expenses to the amount 
actually paid for treatment.”). 
 123.  Id. at 1202–03. 
 124.  See id. at 1202 (“For example, a plaintiff incurs a medical bill for 
$10,000. . . . The $10,000 bill is settled for $2,000. However, claiming the 
plaintiff incurred only $2,000 in treatment distorts the degree of medical care 
and physical damages actually incurred by the plaintiff . . . .”). 
 125.  See Howell v. Hamilton Meat Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130, 1146 (Cal. 
2011) (noting that because the defendant conceded that the billed amount was 
relevant in this case, the court would not offer an opinion on whether the billed 
amount should be admissible to prove non-economic damages or damages for 
future medical expenses). 
 126.  See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.20 (West 2015) (codifying the rule 
promulgated in Robinson v. Bates). 
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 C. Complete or Partial Abandonment of the Collateral Source 
Rule 
Some states have completely abandoned the collateral source 
rule, effectively eliminating the write-off issue.127 In these states, 
the insurer generally retains the right to subrogate against the 
tortfeasor directly.128 Similarly, certain states allow for, or 
require, a post-trial damages reduction of collateral payments, 
which would also eliminate the issue.129 These statutory 
modifications to the collateral source rule have generally emerged 
from broader tort reform efforts.130  
In a series of decisions in the late 1990s, the Alabama 
Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the legislative 
attempts to abrogate the collateral source rule.131 It ultimately 
decided in Marsh v. Green132 that it was not the place of the 
                                                                                                     
 127.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-45 (2015) (abrogating the collateral source 
rule as a rule of evidence at trial); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4545 (McKinney 2015) 
(“[E]vidence shall be admissible for consideration by the court to establish that 
any such past or future cost or expense was or will, with reasonable certainty, 
be replaced or indemnified, in whole or in part, from any collateral source . . . .”). 
 128.  See Todd, supra note 6, at 993 (“In Alabama, the plaintiff’s insurer, 
however, would be able to exercise its subrogation rights against the 
defendant . . . .”). 
 129.  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.17.070 (West 2015) (“After the fact 
finder has rendered an award to a claimant, . . . defendant may introduce 
evidence of amounts received or to be received by the claimant as compensation 
for the same injury from collateral sources that do not have a right of 
subrogation by law or contract.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76(1) (West 2015) (“[T]he 
court shall reduce the amount of such award by the total of all amounts which 
have been paid for the benefit of the claimant, or which are otherwise available 
to the claimant, from all collateral sources . . . .”). 
 130.  See Todd, supra note 6, at 977–80 (describing the status of the 
collateral source rule in states that have adopted tort reform). Todd argues that 
the efforts to improve tort systems by abrogating the collateral source rule have 
instead “created greater fragmentation and inconsistency.” Id. at 979. 
 131.  See Marsh v. Green, 782 So. 2d 223 (Ala. 2000) (finding the statutory 
abrogation of the collateral source rule to be constitutional); Am. Legion Post 
No. 57 v. Leahy, 681 So. 2d 1337, 1338 (Ala. 1996), overruled by Marsh v. Green, 
782 So. 2d 223 (Ala. 2000) (finding the statutory abrogation of the collateral 
source rule to be unconstitutional); see also Benjamin B. Coulter, No Longer as 
Good as Dead: The Continued Revival of Alabama’s Medical and Hospital 
Expenses Exception to the Collateral Source Rule a Decade After Marsh, 42 
CUMB. L. REV. 299, 301–11 (2012) (recounting the history of the collateral source 
rule in Alabama). 
 132.  782 So. 2d 223 (Ala. 2000). 
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courts to assess the wisdom of otherwise constitutional action by 
the legislature.133 While the court allowed the abandonment of 
the rule to stand in the end, its initial reluctance to do so signals 
that the rule remains a critical part of the tort system in the eyes 
of the courts.134  
IV. Argument in Favor of the California Approach 
The traditional common law collateral source rule has drawn 
legitimate criticism as to its relevance in modern tort law.135 
Abandoning the rule altogether, however, has had equally 
troublesome results.136 A compromise that limits the scope of the 
rule without completely abandoning it is the most workable 
solution. A modified approach to the collateral source rule that 
allows defendants to introduce evidence of written-off medical 
bills can serve as an effective method of preserving the 
protections of the rule while limiting inflated damage awards.137 
While California and Ohio have both solved the write-off issue 
without abandoning the collateral source rule, the California 
                                                                                                     
 133.  See id. at 231 (“These concerns deal with the wisdom of legislative 
policy rather than constitutional issues. Matters of policy are for the Legislature 
and, whether wise or unwise, legislative policies are of no concern to the 
courts.”). High courts in other states that have attempted to abandon the 
collateral source rule statutorily have struck down the legislation as 
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Farley v. Engelken, 740 P.2d 1058, 1068 (Kan. 1987) 
(finding that the abrogation of the collateral source rule violated equal 
protection); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 838 (N.H. 1980) (same); Armeson 
v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 137 (N.D. 1978) (finding that abrogating the 
collateral source rule violated substantive due process). 
 134.  See Marsh, 782 So. 2d at 231 (“[A] court cannot hold a statute invalid 
because of its view that there are elements therein which are violative of 
natural justice or in conflict with the court's notions of natural, social, or 
political rights of the citizen.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 135.  See supra Part II.B (presenting the arguments in favor of abandoning 
the collateral source rule). 
 136.  See Todd, supra note 6, at 979 (arguing that tort reform has “created 
greater fragmentation and inconsistency” in tort law). 
 137.  See infra Parts IV.A–IV.B (evaluating the effect of the California 
approach on each of the rationales and criticisms of the collateral source rule). 
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approach is most practical.138 Although it is not perfect, it can be 
altered to compensate for many of the concerns it creates.139  
A. A Modified Approach Preserves the Protections of the Collateral 
Source Rule 
The collateral source rule is supported by many rationales, 
such as its deterrent effect,140 its litigation finance role,141 its 
interplay with the reasonable value doctrine,142 the fact that 
plaintiffs pay for the benefit of health insurance,143 and the rule’s 
integration into the subrogation process.144 Because abandoning 
the rule would undermine these still relevant purposes, a 
modified approach is the best method of reforming the collateral 
source rule. Although a modified approach does not entirely 
preserve each of these rationales,145 it is nonetheless the most 
practical way to balance the purposes of the rule with the reality 
of modern healthcare billing practices. 
A modified approach best preserves the collateral source 
rule’s desirable deterrent effect because the defendant pays the 
entire amount incurred for medical expenses, not just the amount 
the plaintiff herself paid.146 In jurisdictions where the collateral 
                                                                                                     
 138. See infra Part IV.C (arguing that the California approach is more 
practical than the Ohio approach). 
 139.  See infra Part IV.D (proposing alterations to the California approach). 
 140.  See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text (describing the deterrent 
effect of the collateral source rule). 
 141.  See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text (describing the litigation 
finance role of the collateral source rule). 
 142.  See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text (describing the 
interaction between the collateral source rule and the reasonable value rule). 
 143.  See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text (describing the argument 
that the collateral source rule does not create a windfall because plaintiff has 
paid for the benefit of health insurance). 
 144.  See supra notes 37–42 and accompanying text (describing the 
relationship between the collateral source rule and subrogation). 
 145.  See infra Part IV.D (describing the effect of a modified approach on the 
litigation finance role of the collateral source rule). 
 146.  Compare Howell v. Hamilton Meat Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130, 
1145 (Cal. 2011) (permitting a plaintiff to recover only the amount the medical 
provider accepted as payment for medical services), and Robinson v. Bates, 857 
N.E.2d 1195, 1200–01 (Ohio 2007) (permitting the trier-of-fact to determine the 
reasonable value of medical services after both the amount billed and amount 
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source rule has been abandoned, the plaintiff’s health insurance 
carrier must initiate separate proceedings against the defendant 
to recover the portion of the plaintiff’s medical bills it paid.147 
This method of subrogation imposes a larger cost on insurance 
carriers than the typical method in which the carrier subrogates 
against the plaintiff directly.148 This higher cost could cause the 
carrier to forgo subrogation against the defendant.149 In those 
cases, the defendant’s liability is ultimately much less than the 
reasonable value of the plaintiff’s medical expenses—arguably 
substantially reducing the defendant’s deterrence. 
A modified approach works best with the reasonable value 
doctrine because almost no one can reasonably be expected to pay 
the billed amount.150 Discounts are far reaching: healthcare 
providers negotiate these discounts not only with health 
insurance carriers, but also with Medicare, Medicaid, and similar 
state-run programs.151 Even uninsured patients could receive 
discounts in some cases.152 Given the widespread nature of these 
discounts, the presumption of reasonability favoring the billed 
amount is flawed and should be re-evaluated. That is not to say 
that the billed amount is inherently unreasonable; rather, the 
circumstances in which that amount is reasonable are so rare 
                                                                                                     
accepted as payment have been introduced to evidence), with ALA. CODE § 12-21-
45 (2015) (limiting a plaintiff’s recovery to the amount she actually paid by 
abrogating the collateral source rule). 
 147.  See, e.g., Todd, supra note 6, at 993 (indicating that in jurisdictions in 
which the collateral source rule has been abandoned, the insurance carrier may 
pursue subrogation rights against a defendant directly). 
 148.  See Wershbale, supra note 2, at 349–50 (describing the high 
administrative costs associated with subrogation). 
 149.  See Todd, supra note 6, at 995 (noting that “insurers typically do not 
bring direct actions” against defendants); Wershbale, supra note 2, at 349 
(“[I]nsurers often do not exercise the right to subrogation.”). 
 150.  See Healthcare Service Costs Hearing, supra note 12, at 105 (“Under 
the current system hospitals and physicians have the ability to post any price 
they choose. There is not a requirement that anyone ever pays that posted price 
and in fact the posted price is seldom paid.”). 
 151.  See Howell, 257 P.3d at 1142 (“Because so many patients, insured, 
uninsured, and recipients under government healthcare programs, pay 
discounted rates, hospital bills have been called insincere, in the sense that they 
would yield truly enormous profits if those prices were actually paid.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
 152. See id. (“In California, medical providers are expressly authorized to 
offer the uninsured discounts . . . .”). 
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that a presumption of reasonability is misplaced.153 Thus, in 
reality, the traditional collateral source rule serves to undermine 
the reasonable value doctrine rather than support it. A modified 
approach permits the trier-of-fact to arrive at the reasonable 
value for medical expenses more effectively than under the 
common law collateral source rule. 
Advocates for the collateral source rule argue that the 
defendant should not benefit from the plaintiff’s decision to 
maintain health insurance coverage, and because the plaintiff 
paid for that benefit through monthly insurance premiums, she 
should be able to recover the full amount of her medical bills.154 A 
modified approach preserves this function of the collateral source 
rule because, while the plaintiff is not permitted to recover the 
write-off, she is still permitted to recover the full amount that she 
and her insurance carrier actually paid.155 The defendant does 
not benefit from the plaintiff’s choice to maintain insurance 
coverage because she must still pay the full cost of her 
wrongdoing, as measured by the amount the healthcare provider 
accepted as payment for its services.156 In addition, because 
discounts may be available even to uninsured patients in certain 
cases, the amount the defendant pays may be the same 
regardless of whether the plaintiff was insured.157 
A modified approach does not change the way the plaintiff’s 
insurance carrier exercises its subrogation rights. The plaintiff’s 
insurance carrier is only entitled to the portion of the plaintiff’s 
recovery that it actually paid, making the fact that the plaintiff 
does not recover the write-off irrelevant to the subrogation 
                                                                                                     
 153. See Healthcare Service Costs Hearing, supra note 12, at 105 (indicating 
that charged amounts are seldom actually paid). 
 154.  See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 8.6(3) (“[I]t is said that the collateral source 
rule encourages the plaintiff to protect himself by the purchase of insurance by 
making sure he reaps its value.”). 
 155.  See Howell, 257 P.3d at 1145 (holding that the plaintiff may recover 
“the amounts paid by the plaintiff or his or her insurer for the medical services 
received or still owing at the time of trial”). 
 156.  See supra notes 150–153 and accompanying text (arguing that the 
amount the healthcare provider accepts as payment should be the presumed 
reasonable value of the services). 
 157.  See Howell, 257 P.3d at 1142 (indicating that hospitals in California are 
permitted to offer discounts to uninsured patients). 
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issue.158 In states where the collateral source rule has been 
abandoned, the health insurance carrier must subrogate against 
the defendant.159 This method is less desirable for both the 
plaintiff’s health insurance carrier and the defendant’s liability 
insurance carrier.160 It is easier and more cost-effective for the 
plaintiff’s carrier to subrogate against the plaintiff directly.161 In 
states where the health insurance carrier must pursue 
subrogation against the defendant, the defendant’s liability 
insurance carrier is left uncertain as to the possibility of separate 
subrogation proceedings after trial. By contrast, a modified 
approach preserves the traditional relationship between the 
collateral source rule and subrogation, allowing courts to adopt 
the approach without concern that the subrogation procedure will 
be undermined.162  
B. A Modified Approach Also Addresses Some of the Rule’s 
Criticisms 
The collateral source rule has been challenged on the 
grounds that it allows the plaintiff to receive a double-recovery,163 
on the grounds that it allows plaintiffs to recover artificially 
inflated retail mark-ups on medical expenses that are ultimately 
                                                                                                     
 158.  See Roberts, supra note 75, at 137–38 (“A right of subrogation extends 
only to amounts paid by the insurer and therefore the right to subrogation does 
not allow a health care insurer to recover the amount of the contractual write-
off.”). 
 159.  See Todd, supra note 6, at 993 (describing subrogation in states that 
have abandoned the collateral source rule). 
 160.  See id. at 995 (indicating that health insurance carriers prefer not to 
bring actions directly against defendants). 
 161.  See id. at 996 (noting that most states prefer post-trial reduction of a 
plaintiff’s damages award rather than separate proceedings between the 
plaintiff’s insurance carrier and the defendant). 
 162.  See Howell, 257 P.3d at 1135 (“Since insurance policies frequently allow 
the insurer to reclaim the benefits paid out of a tort recovery by refund or 
subrogation, the rule, without providing the plaintiff a double recovery, ensures 
the tortfeasor cannot avoid payment of full compensation for the injury 
inflicted.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 163.  See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text (presenting the 
argument that the collateral source rule is contrary to the notion of corrective 
justice). 
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written off,164 and on the grounds that healthcare and tort reform 
have eroded the role of the rule in modern litigation.165 In 
addition to solving the write-off issue, a modified approach also 
ameliorates many of the rule’s other criticisms. 
Critics of the collateral source rule argue that it permits the 
plaintiff to recover an unfair windfall.166 Proponents of the rule 
argue that this double-recovery is necessary to ensure that the 
defendant pays the full cost of her wrongdoing.167 A modified 
approach strikes a balance between these two viewpoints by 
reducing the amount the plaintiff can recover while still ensuring 
that the defendant pays the reasonable cost of her wrongdoing.168 
This approach best satisfies both understandings of corrective 
justice: the wronged plaintiff is made whole, and the defendant 
pays the full cost of her wrongdoing.169 
On its face, abandoning the rule could arguably be the best 
solution in light of healthcare reform. If the PPACA’s individual 
mandate were taken to mean universal access to health 
insurance, then the collateral source rule would be unnecessary 
in the context of damages for medical expenses.170 This is not, 
                                                                                                     
 164.  See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text (introducing the write-off 
problem). 
 165.  See supra notes 49–63 and accompanying text (describing the 
arguments that the collateral source rule should be abandoned due to 
healthcare reform and tort reform). 
 166.  See Todd, supra note 6, at 972 (“This double recovery scenario creates a 
situation where the plaintiff is put in a better position than before the tort 
occurred, thereby conflicting with the compensatory function of tort law.”). 
 167.  See Krause & Kidd, supra note 2, at 22 (asserting that the tortfeasor 
has a duty to compensate the victim that should not be “extinguished by favors 
bestowed on the victim by a third party”). 
 168.  See supra notes 150–153 and accompanying text (arguing that the 
discounted amount represents the reasonable value of medical services). 
 169.  See Krause & Kidd, supra note 2, at 26–28 (describing the relationship 
between the collateral source rule and the two competing understandings of 
corrective justice: making victims whole and righting wrongs). Krause and Kidd 
argue that the collateral source rule is best understood in the context of a 
corrective justice system based on righting wrongs rather than making victims 
whole. See id. at 28 (“When the collateral source rule is displayed side by side 
with a system of corrective justice based on correlativity and personality, 
wherein tort law is not concerned with making the victim whole but rather with 
righting wrongs, the two emerge harmoniously.”). 
 170.  See Todd, supra note 6, at 967 (“[T]he collateral source rule, when 
applied to medical expenses covered by health insurers, has less utility when 
there is universal healthcare coverage, as aspired to under the [PPACA].”). 
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however, a realistic characterization of the individual mandate—
there is not universal access to health insurance. 171 Even if there 
were, there are vast differences between health insurance 
policies.172 The California approach recognizes the increased 
access to negotiated discounts following the individual mandate, 
yet preserves the still necessary protections of the collateral 
source rule.173 
A modified approach also addresses some of the goals of tort 
reform without destroying the protections of the collateral source 
rule. A primary aim of tort reform is to reduce excessive damage 
awards.174 By eliminating the write-off from the plaintiff’s 
recovery, a modified approach reduces the artificial inflation of 
medical expenses but avoids the erratic effects of abandoning the 
collateral source rule.175 Thus, a modified approach serves as an 
effective compromise that achieves a measure of meaningful 
reform without undermining the purposes of the collateral source 
rule. 
C. The California Approach Is Most Practical 
While both California and Ohio courts allow a defendant to 
introduce evidence of a write-off, the two approaches have notable 
differences.176 The Ohio approach permits parties to introduce 
                                                                                                     
 171.  See id. at 968 (“The absence of universal coverage undermines the 
arguments supporting the predicted demise of the collateral source rule.”). 
 172.  See, e.g., Healthcare Service Costs Hearing, supra note 12, at 106 
(discussing the widely varying nature of the discounts for healthcare services). 
 173.  See Paige Winfield Cunningham, New England Journal of Medicine 
Report: 10 Million Newly Insured, POLITICO (Jul. 23, 2014), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/07/new-england-journal-of-medicine-report-
obamacare-109304.html (last visited June 5, 2015) (reporting that one study 
found that 10 million Americans were newly insured because of the PPACA) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 174.  See Wershbale, supra note 2, at 349 (“The concern is that where the 
fact-finder remains uninformed, or there is no collateral source setoff, a 
successful plaintiff acquires a windfall, being awarded monetary damages in 
excess of necessary and reasonable medical costs.”). 
 175.  See Todd, supra note 6, at 979 (describing the inconsistent and 
fragmented practical results of abandoning the collateral source rule). 
 176. Compare Howell v. Hamilton Meat Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130, 
1146 (Cal. 2011) (limiting a plaintiff’s recovery to the amount actually paid by 
the plaintiff and her health insurance carrier), with Robinson v. Bates, 857 
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evidence of both the amount initially billed and the amount 
ultimately collected to the trier-of-fact, who then ultimately bears 
the burden of deciding the reasonable value of the medical 
services.177 By contrast, the California approach only permits a 
plaintiff to recover the amount accepted as payment, and goes as 
far as to say that the amount initially billed is inadmissible 
because it is irrelevant to the calculations of economic damages 
for past medical expenses.178  
On its face, the Ohio approach better enables a trier-of-fact to 
perform its duty to ascertain the reasonable value of medical 
expenses because this approach permits parties to introduce the 
maximum amount of information into evidence.179 In theory, the 
trier-of-fact can parse through the complex records, bills, and 
discounts to arrive at the reasonable value.180 Parties could hire 
expert witnesses to assist the judge or jury in understanding the 
complicated and largely arbitrary systems medical providers use 
to value their services.181 However, the resources required to 
effectively educate judges and juries on hospital billing practices 
in even the most routine personal injury cases would be 
enormous.182 These costs can be avoided by employing the 
                                                                                                     
N.E.2d 1195, 1197 (Ohio 2006) (allowing a jury to determine the reasonable 
value of medical expenses after considering all the relevant evidence, including 
both the amount billed and the amount accepted as payment). 
 177.  See Robinson, 857 N.E.2d at 1197 (“[B]oth the original bill rendered 
and the amount accepted as full payment for medical services should have been 
admitted . . . .”). 
 178.  See Howell, 257 P.3d at 1146 (“Where the provider has, by prior 
agreement, accepted less than a billed amount as full payment, evidence of the 
full billed amount is not itself relevant on the issue of past medical expenses.”). 
 179.  See Robinson, 857 N.E.2d at 1200 (“Due to the realities of today's 
insurance and reimbursement system, in any given case, that determination is 
not necessarily the amount of the original bill or the amount paid. Instead, the 
reasonable value of medical services is a matter for the jury to determine from 
all relevant evidence.”). 
 180.  See id. (“To avoid the creation of separate categories of plaintiffs based 
on individual insurance coverage, we decline to adopt a categorical rule. Because 
different insurance arrangements exist, the fairest approach is to make the 
defendant liable for the reasonable value of plaintiff's medical treatment.”). 
 181.  See, e.g., Healthcare Service Costs Hearing, supra note 12, at 106 (“The 
hospitals often do not know how they set each charge on the charge master file. 
There is not a formula that hospitals use to set charges. . . . [T]he charges are 
not set by market forces or using a systematic methodology.”). 
 182.  Cf. Howell, 257 P.3d at 1142 (“The dissent's proposal that the insured 
46 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 16 (2015) 
California approach, which assumes that the amount the 
healthcare provider accepted as payment was the commercially 
reasonable value of the medical services.183 
The California approach allows a measure of predictability in 
litigation that the Ohio approach does not. Allowing a trier-of-fact 
to determine which is most reasonable between the amounts a 
medical provider initially bills and the amount it ultimately 
collects introduces yet another wildcard into already 
unpredictable civil litigation.184 Given the large percentage of 
personal injury cases that are settled before trial, the California 
approach permits parties to negotiate a settlement with an 
accurate standard that reflects the likely calculation of medical 
expenses at trial.185 
D. Altering the California Approach 
The California approach is the most practical solution to the 
write-off issue. The approach is not, however, without its 
                                                                                                     
plaintiff recover the ‘reasonable value’ of his or her care, to be proven in each 
case by expert testimony is also troubling because it would routinely involve 
violations of the evidentiary aspect of the collateral source rule.”). 
 183.  Cf. Kenney v. Liston, 460 S.E.2d 434, 452 (W. Va. 2014) (Loughry, J., 
dissenting) (“Are we to blindly accept the fiction that hospitals and other 
medical providers routinely and as a matter of freely-negotiated contracts accept 
less than the reasonable value of their services?”). It is worth noting that while 
this Note argues that the amount accepted as payment should be presumed to 
be the reasonable value of medical services, the California court did not engage 
in a reasonableness analysis. Rather, the court seemed to suggest that the 
plaintiff can only recover the amount that was actually paid, even if that 
amount was unreasonably low. See Howell, 257 P.3d at 1138 (“Thus the general 
rule under the Restatement, as well as California law, is that a personal injury 
plaintiff may recover the lesser of (a) the amount paid or incurred for medical 
services, and (b) the reasonable value of the services.”). The solution this Note 
proposes alters this approach to ensure that the plaintiff recovers the 
reasonable value of her medical expenses, even in cases where the provider 
accepted an unreasonably low amount as payment. See infra Part IV.D 
(proposing alterations to the California approach that would address the main 
concerns, such as reasonability). 
 184.  See generally Valerie P. Hans & Theodore Eisenberg, The Predictability 
of Juries, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 375 (2011) (evaluating the predictability of jury 
trials). 
 185.  See Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1919, 1951–56 (2009) (discussing the dominant role of settlement in civil 
litigation). 
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shortcomings. The bright-line rule that a plaintiff can only 
recover the amount she and her insurance carrier actually paid 
constrains the role of the jury in calculating damages. In 
addition, the approach may eliminate the collateral source rule’s 
function as a method for plaintiffs to finance litigation. Finally, 
the California approach could theoretically incentivize 
individuals not to procure insurance coverage as mandated by the 
PPACA. Although some of these concerns cannot be easily 
rectified, most can be addressed by altering the approach. 
By setting the amount actually paid as the maximum 
amount the plaintiff can receive, the California approach heavily 
constrains the role of the jury in determining appropriate 
damages for past medical expenses.186 This weakness could be 
overcome by altering the approach so that the amount paid is 
presumed reasonable, but the plaintiff may rebut the 
presumption by introducing evidence that the amount accepted 
as payment was unreasonable. This would account for the 
scenario in which a healthcare provider does accept an 
unreasonably low amount as payment for medical care. This 
would also preserve the role of the jury in determining whether 
the amount was reasonable by essentially reversing the common 
presumption that medical bills are prima facie evidence of 
reasonable medical expenses.187 
Limiting the common law collateral source rule erodes the 
litigation finance role of the collateral source rule. The amount a 
plaintiff receives in excess of what she and her insurance carrier 
paid has allowed the plaintiff to be made whole even after paying 
her attorney.188 By eliminating this amount from the plaintiff’s 
recovery, the plaintiff must pay her attorneys’ fees out of her own 
                                                                                                     
 186.  See Howell, 257 P.3d at 1146 (“Where a trial jury has heard evidence of 
the amount accepted as full payment by the medical provider but has awarded a 
greater sum as damages for past medical expenses, the defendant may move for 
a new trial on grounds of excessive damages.”). 
 187.  See supra note 10 (presenting the statutory provisions in Virginia and 
West Virginia giving medical bills a prima facie presumption of reasonability). 
 188.  See Jeremy Kidd, To Fund or Not to Fund: The Need for Second Best 
Solutions to the Litigation Finance Dilemma, 8 J. L. ECON & POL’Y 613, 638 
(2012) (“While not traditionally thought of as a form of litigation finance, the 
common law doctrine known as the ‘collateral source rule’ provides some relief 
to poor and middle-class tort victims as they recuperate and attempt to recover 
from a tortfeasor.”). 
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pocket in cases in which punitive damages or pain and suffering 
damages are not sufficient to finance these costs. This approach 
could prevent plaintiffs from bringing otherwise legitimate 
lawsuits or prevent plaintiffs’ attorneys from being paid.189 As a 
result, this could lead to conflict between the plaintiff’s insurance 
carrier and her attorney about which party gets paid and which 
party does not should the carrier choose to subrogate. While this 
is a legitimate concern, the collateral source rule does not create 
this problem. Rather, the rule has enabled a work-around that 
allows a plaintiff to pay both her insurance carrier and her 
attorney.190 The heart of this problem lies with the contingency 
fee arrangements plaintiffs’ attorneys employ to finance 
litigation. The solution to this problem may come through 
reforming litigation financing practices, or possibly through 
instituting a loser-pays civil litigation system, but it ultimately 
rests outside the scope of any reasonably practical modification to 
the collateral source rule.191  
A modified approach may also encourage patients to shirk 
their obligations to procure health insurance under the PPACA. 
Because the approach limits the plaintiff’s recovery to the amount 
actually paid, a potential claimant would receive a higher 
recovery if her hospital bills were not discounted at all. In 
general, the only patients that pay undiscounted rates are the 
uninsured.192 This creates a theoretical reason not to procure 
insurance coverage, although in reality few people factor future 
tort recovery into their decision about whether to procure health 
insurance.193 
                                                                                                     
 189.  See DOBBS, supra note 3, at 494–95 (asserting that the collateral source 
rule allows a plaintiff to pad her damage award so that she can pay her 
attorneys’ fees and still be made whole).  
 190.  See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text (explaining how the 
collateral source rule has permitted plaintiffs to finance litigation by allowing 
the payment of attorneys’ fees out of the damages for expenses already paid by a 
collateral source). 
 191.  See Kidd, supra note 188, at 617 (asserting that the best solution to the 
litigation finance problem is to expand access to traditional modes of finance 
and market credit to encompass litigation). 
 192.  See Healthcare Service Costs Hearing, supra note 12, at 99 (“The only 
patients asked to pay these full charges are the uninsured, some people with 
high deductible health savings accounts, and the international visitors.”). 
 193.  Cf. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 8.6(3) (“[I]t may be said that if the plaintiff 
has paid for the insurance benefits, he probably did not do so in hope of a double 
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Altering the California approach to create a rebuttable 
presumption rather than a bright-line rule creates the most 
workable and fair solution to bring the collateral source rule in 
line with the reality of modern healthcare billing practices. This 
would ensure that plaintiffs receive reasonable compensation for 
medical expenses without introducing the added cost and 
uncertainty to litigation that the Ohio approach would create.194 
While this alteration to the California approach does not solve 
every potential issue, it does preserve the essential protections of 
the collateral source rule while also accomplishing meaningful 
and practical reform that reduces artificially inflated damage 




While often the subject of debate, the collateral source rule 
remains an important and relevant part of the American tort 
system.196 The rule nonetheless creates a dilemma when 
confronted with the reality that plaintiffs rarely pay billed 
amounts for medical expenses.197 This raises questions as to 
whether the presumption that medical bills are prima facie 
evidence of the reasonable value of medical services is 
appropriate.198 Of the approaches courts have taken to this issue, 
the Supreme Court of California’s modified approach most 
effectively resolves the issue.199 The approach serves as a middle 
                                                                                                     
recovery.”). 
 194.  See supra notes 179–185 and accompanying text (arguing that the Ohio 
approach introduces unnecessary expense and uncertainty into litigation). 
 195.  See Healthcare Service Costs Hearing, supra note 12, at 106 (describing 
scenarios in which there is a negotiated discount of as high as 900 percent yet 
the hospital still receives a profit). 
 196.  See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text (describing the rise of the 
collateral source rule as a fundamental pillar of the tort system). 
 197.  See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text (introducing the write-off 
problem). 
 198.  See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text (arguing that statutory 
presumptions of medical bills’ reasonability undermine the trier-of-fact’s ability 
to accurately determine the reasonable value of past medical expenses). 
 199.  See supra notes 176–185 and accompanying text (arguing that the 
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ground between the traditional application of the collateral 
source rule and abandonment of the rule. The plaintiff retains the 
benefit of the collateral source rule by recovering the total 
amount both she and her insurance carrier paid, yet defendants 
do not pay artificially inflated damages. While the approach is 
not perfect, courts can alter it to address most concerns.200 By 
implementing this altered version of the California approach to 
the write-off issue, courts can achieve meaningful and practical 
reform to the tort system without abandoning the protections of 
the collateral source rule. 
 
 
                                                                                                     
California approach is the most practical way to reduce inflated awards for 
medical expenses). 
 200.  See supra notes 186–195 and accompanying text (proposing alterations 
to the California approach to address its potential shortcomings). 
